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ABSTRACT 
Dynamic theories of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”. In this paper I 
develop a version of the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument in order to show that time does 
not pass, but that this is no threat to dynamic theories of time.  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Certain views in the philosophy of time are described as ‘dynamic’. I 
borrow from Olson (2009: 3) in describing a ‘dynamic’ theory as one 
according to which: ‘certain times or events are absolutely present, and there 
is continual change in respect of which ones they are’. Dynamic views of time 
typically commit to the claim that “time passes”.1  
Dynamic views are supposedly highly intuitive. It seems most natural to 
suppose that time passes, and that a dynamic view is true. It is also highly 
intuitive to suppose that this feature of time (its passing) allows us to 
                                                        
1 See, inter alia, Markosian (1993). 
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distinguish time from space and that this somehow plays a crucial role in a 
theory’s being dynamic.2 
Nonetheless, arguments have been put forward against dynamic views of 
time. The argument that interests me here focuses upon the claim that ‘time 
passes’ as the weak-point of dynamic theories. The general tenor of these 
arguments is that, because there are good reasons to deny that time passes, so 
there are good reasons to deny the dynamic theories of time. In fact, as Raven 
(2010) notes, there are two such putative arguments against the possibility of 
time’s passing: the ‘no rate’ argument (NRA) and the ‘no alternate 
possibilities’ (NAP) argument.  NRA has received a good deal of attention in 
the wider literature; I have nothing to add (here) to that debate.3  
My focus is on NAP. The argument is suggested, though not developed, 
by Price (1993: 13). Semi-formally, it takes the following form:  
 
(NAP) 
1. If x passes, then the rate at which x passes could be different 
2. Time cannot pass at a rate other than 1s/s 
Therefore, 
3. Time does not pass 
 
Premise (2) seems (relatively) uncontroversial; I shall say nothing more 
about it. The motivation for (1) is seemingly that a coherent rate is one that 
could have had other values.4 My claim is that there is a version of NAP that, 
modulo certain assumptions, is effective against the thesis that time passes.  
I begin (section 2) by considering responses to NAP due to Maudlin, Price 
and Raven. I then move to offering a variation on NAP, suggesting that it 
                                                        
2 See, inter alia, Markosian (1993: 830) 
3 See, inter alia, Olson (2009), Philips (2009), Skow (2011), and Tallant (2010). The 
NRA, roughly stated is that: all things that pass, pass at a rate. If time passed, it would 
pass at 1s/s. 1s/s is not a rate. So, time does not pass. 
4 Cf. Raven (2010: 464), who remarks of the temporal case: ‘The necessity of the rate 
of time’s passage entails that there are no possible alternative rates, hence (allegedly) 
entailing the incoherence of the rate itself’. 
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delivers the result that we should not think that time passes given a dynamic 
view of time. 
 
 
2. Maudlin, Price and Raven on NAP 
 
Each of Maudlin, Price and Raven offer a response to NAP. Both Price 
and Raven respond to Maudlin (though with different conclusions), so it is 
with Maudlin’s view that I begin. 
 
2.1 Maudlin’s NAP  
 
Maudlin (2007: 112-3) responds to (what I’m calling) NAP by trying to 
demonstrate that there are coherent rates that are fixed of necessity. To 
illustrate, consider an exchange rate. We can specify that a given currency has 
an exchange rate of 1 unit of that currency per unit of that currency: for 
instance, $1/$1. We could specify other rates of exchange for a currency to 
stand in to itself. There’s nothing conceptually problematic about an exchange 
rate of, for example, $3/$1.  
But (and this is crucial), necessarily, the only fair rate of exchange is 
1n/1n—$1/$1. So, necessarily, $1/$1 is the only fair rate of exchange for the 
dollar. This is a coherent rate; it is a coherent rate that is fixed of necessity. 
And so we have a rate that is fixed of necessity and that is unproblematic. 
Not so. Raven notes an obvious response, and though he does not appear 
to endorse it, I do. The rate of exchange is not fixed of necessity at all. There 
are many possible rates of exchange available and these different rates could 
have been otherwise.5 Whilst no such rate would have the property of being 
fair, that’s beside the point. This is still a case where we have a rate of 
exchange and where there are other possible rates. (Indeed, it’s tempting to 
think that the rate of exchange can only be described as ‘fair’ because other 
rates are possible: e.g. ‘if there were no other possible rates, it would make no 
sense to ascribe fairness (or otherwise) to the rate’.)  
                                                        
5 Indeed, I wonder whether there are other fair rates of exchange. Suppose that Verity 
is very wealthy (she is of ‘the 1%’). Would a ‘fair’ rate of exchange not see her lose 
out relative to the 99%? 
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In any case, the point is this: Maudlin tries to respond to NAP by showing 
that there are rates that are fixed of necessity. The example that he introduces 
is not a rate that is fixed of necessity. The rate could be other, though wouldn’t 
thereby be fair. As a consequence, the example does not show that there can 
be coherent rates that are fixed of necessity.  
 
2.2 Raven’s NAP 
 
Raven (2010: 459) introduces and endorses ‘Passivisim’: there is some 
literal truth to the metaphor that ‘time passes’.  
As Raven (2010: 464) notes, there are many instances of ratios that are 
fixed of necessity; π is a case in point. It is hard to see that there should be 
anything incoherent about a ratio that just so happens to also be a rate—like 
the rate of time’s passing—just because it is fixed of necessity. As Raven 
(2010: 464) puts it: ‘If π is a necessary but coherent ratio, why should the 
necessity of the rate of time’s passage establish its incoherence?’ 
As Raven goes on to note, one obvious line of response is that any rate 
that is fixed of necessity is, in some way, uninformative, trivial, or useless and 
that this constitutes a problem.  
However, Raven does not think that this response has any mileage. 
 
[E]ven if the complainers make it tolerably clear what they mean by 
‘trivial’, ‘uninformative’, and ‘useless’, the complaint is irrelevant. The 
real issue is passivism: that time passes. The relevance of the rate of 
time’s passage to passivism is that passivism entails that time passes at 
a rate. Passivism simply does not entail that time passes at a non-trivial 
or informative or useful rate. Even a trivial, uninformative, and useless 
rate is still a rate. … To concede this is to concede nothing significant: 
it is not to concede that passivism itself is trivial, uninformative, or 
useless.  (Raven, 2010: 464-5) 
 
But what Raven concedes here is that which Price (2013: 303-4) thinks is 
troubling for the dynamic theorist. 
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2.3 Price’s NAP 
 
Where Raven concludes that the rate of time’s passage being necessarily, 
and a priori, of some fixed value is uninformative and trivial, Price agrees, but 
thinks that the rate being necessarily, a priori, of some fixed value is problematic. 
To illustrate, Price (2013: 304) invites us to consider a spatial case where a 
traveler completes a journey of 500 miles and in doing so puts 500 miles 
behind him;  
 
‘the reference to the rate [500 miles per 500 miles] is entirely vacuous’, 
for ‘there are not two things…but just one (the tally of miles). 
Maudlin’s exchange rate example misses the point because it provides 
two things to tally: the dollars you give me, and the dollars I give you’. 
 
Price then offers some remarks (that could be seen) as a response to 
Raven.6 
 
In defence of Maudlin, one might say that the triviality isn’t a fault but 
a feature… Fine, but we’ve just seen that we can have spatial rates in 
the same (trivial) sense. What we were supposed to be after was a 
notion of flow, or flux, which would capture what’s supposed to be 
special about time.   
 
Price then (rightly) points out that if time passes in just the same way that 
space “passes”, then (as the scare quotes indicate) this doesn’t seem to be a 
notion of passage that will capture what is supposed to be special about time. 
We can have “spatial passage” in this trivial fashion.  
It is therefore hard to see that this very thin notion of passage could be 
what differentiates time from space, and so it is hard to see that this notion 
could play the key role required of it in a dynamic theory: of being the 
difference between time and space. 
However, I think that Price’s argument is misguided. Informally, it runs 
thus: 
 
                                                        
6 Though Price does not cite Raven and, of course, both papers appear at the same 
time. 
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PR1: If a dynamic theory of time is true, there must be something to 
differentiate temporal passage from spatial passage 
PR2: What differentiates temporal passage from spatial passage must be 
reflected in the way we express the rate 
PR3: Spatial rates of passage and temporal rates of passage are both trivial 
and of the form 1n/1n  (and so are not differentiated from one another) 
Therefore, 
PRC: It’s not the case that the dynamic theory of time is true 
 
What I don’t see is why the dynamic theorist should endorse PR2. It seems 
open to claim that the way in which the rates can be expressed is trivial; that 
this aspect of the mathematical formalism is exactly the same in both the 
spatial and temporal case. Nonetheless, there remains a significant difference 
between the passage of time and the nature of space. An (unkind) comparison 
will help bring this out. 
People are very different from space. Notably, however, there is a clear 
ratio in which metres stand in to themselves and that people stand in to 
themselves. Thus, for every metre of space between two points, there is a 
metre of space. That is, there is 1m/m of distance between any two points. 
The same ratio stands between the number of people in a given region and 
the number of people in that region: 1p/p. We shouldn’t therefore conclude 
that there is nothing about people that differentiates them from space. Rather, 
we should look to some feature other than the ratios involved to describe the 
difference between people (on the one hand) and distances in space (on the 
other). 
The lesson carries over to the temporal case: we should agree with Price 
that we require some difference between temporal passage and “spatial 
passage”. But we should look to find that difference somewhere other than 
the rate. The obvious thing to say for a dynamic theorist—and this is just to 
repeat the definition of what Olson (2009: 3) thinks it is to be a dynamic 
theorist—is to take the view that, ‘certain times or events are absolutely 
present, and there is continual change in respect of which ones they are’.  
But where we can say this of time, the same cannot be said of space. We 
do not, I take it, think that certain places are absolutely here and that there is 
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continual change in respect of which ones they are—if only because we do 
not think that there is an absolute here.7 
But even if one doesn’t hold that view, it’s really hard to see why the right 
place to look here is the rate, or the fact that 1s/s is a unit of time per itself 
and that 1m/m is a unit of space per itself. The place to look for differences 
between time and space lie in the nature of time and space themselves, not 
the formalism with which we describe their rate of passing. In general, then, 
Price’s suggestion seems to lack bite. We seem to be left in a situation where 
NAP has no force. 
 
 
3. Revising NAP 
 
Nonetheless, there remains something appealing about NAP. To my 
mind, at least, there seems something troubling about treating time as passing 
if (of necessity) it cannot do so at any rate other than 1s/s. In this section of 
the paper I bring forward a challenge—a version of NAP that I think has 
some teeth. 
Focus on rates generally. So far as I can tell, the term ‘rate’ may be applied 
in three different domains (in this context—I ignore uses of ‘rate’ where it is 
used to mean ‘score’ or ‘rank’, such as, ‘rate how useful you found our 
service’):  
 
(a) Cases where an entity changes its property/properties over time8 
Examples: 30km/h (assuming that location is a property—a relational 
property); rates of change (generally); 
 
(b) Cases where finance is involved: 
Examples: tax rate; interest rate; exchange rate, etc. 
 
(c) Cases outside finance where the term seems to indicate a 
proportion 
Examples: Divorce rate; obesity rate, etc. 
                                                        
7 Cf. Tallant (2009: 428). 
8 Or where some entities change their properties over time. 
42 Jonathan Tallant 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 39, n. 4, pp. 35- 47, out.-dez. 2016. 
So far as I am aware, these uses of ‘rate’ are exhaustive (ignoring the 
temporal case and the ranking case). Each case is one where the rate in 
question ‘could have other values’.  
Thus: 
NAP1*: All uncontroversial cases of rates are cases that ‘could have other 
values’ 
NAP2*: If all uncontroversial Fs have some property, G, then, if x is not 
G, then this gives us defeasible reason to think that x is not F. 
NAP3*: The rate of time’s passage could not have any value other than 
1s/s 
NAP4*: We have defeasible reason to think that time does not pass at a 
rate 
Let me now walk through the premises.  
I take it that NAP1* is established by consideration of (a)-(c). (I concede, 
of course, that there may be other uses of the term ‘rate’. But, in that case, my 
opponent should do two things. First, identify these uses. Second, show that 
in these other uses of the term ‘rate’ are such that the rates in question could 
not have had other values.) 
NAP2* should not be controversial; an example will help to explain why. 
It was once thought that all swans are white. The first discovery of an object 
that looked a lot like a swan but that was black was not treated as a swan. In 
1790, when John Latham ‘discovered’ the black swan, it was not recognized 
immediately as belonging to the genus Cygnus. It was classified as monotypic 
genus—a taxonomic grouping with only one member. Thus, that all 
uncontroversial swans were white (or grey, at birth) was a defeasible reason 
to think that this creature was not a swan. Of course, that reason was 
defeasible and was defeated. Various other properties ultimately trumped the 
color consideration (including biological properties). NAP3* is not in dispute. 
Thus, we have reason to think that time does not pass at a rate. Unless given 
reason to think otherwise, we ought to then conclude that: 
NAP5*: Time does not pass at a rate.  
For the time being suppose that’s right. Now, continue the argument with 
another premise: 
 
NAP6*: All uncontroversial cases of ‘things that pass’ are cases where 
those things pass at a rate 
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I see no reason to dispute NAP6*; I certainly cannot think of a counter-
example.  
In conjunction with NAP2* and NAP5*, though, this yields the result that 
we have defeasible reason to think that time does not pass. Once more, if we 
then lack reason to think otherwise, we should conclude that time does not 
pass.   
Thus, the point is not that there is a logical contradiction in supposing that 
time passes at a rate of 1s/s. The point is simply that this sort of putative rate 
doesn’t look at all like a rate; that gives us defeasible reason to think that time 
does not pass at a rate and, so, does not pass at all. 
 
 
4. A weak complaint 
 
Here is an objection. The complaint seems weak. It amounts to the 
complaint that a rate like time’s passing would be unprecedented in not having 
some particular property. That something is unprecedented seems especially 
unlikely to cast much doubt on it in metaphysical contexts. For example, is it 
really a persuasive argument against God’s existence that His existence is 
unprecedented (i.e. that there are no preceding examples of omnipotent, 
omniscient, omnibenevolent necessary beings who created the reality)? For 
the main complaint to be persuasive, more needs to be said about why the 
unprecedented necessity of time’s rate of passage makes it dubious.  
I don’t think that this objection is especially pressing. I agree, of course, 
that an argument similar to NAP* could be used to generate the conclusion 
that we have defeasible reason to think that God does not exist. But, contra 
the imagined objector, I think that this does give us defeasible reason to think 
that there’s no such being. Of course, the reason is defeasible. Anyone moved 
by arguments in favor of the existence of God will likely think a variant on 
NAP* outweighed by those very considerations. But that an argument, A, is 
outweighed by another, A*, does not mean that A is of no value. 
It would be tempting, then, to think that there is an easy route to a reply. 
NAP4* simply noted that we have a defeasible reason to think that time does 
not pass. And so, in just the same way that an argument, A*, for the existence 
of God can be used to outweigh a variant on NAP* intended to show God 
not exist, we should simply look for arguments that show that time does pass. 
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Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 39, n. 4, pp. 35- 47, out.-dez. 2016. 
That, surely, will be easy: proponents of passage will, at this point, just wheel-
out whatever arguments they appealed to in the first place and claim that these 
trump NAP* in just the same way that those who believe that God exists will 
claim that A* trumps A. 
I deny that there are any good arguments to support the truth of the claim 
that ‘time passes’. My reasoning is simple. Suppose that you are a dynamic 
theorist of time. You do not, then, think that there is a thing, time, that passes. 
Rather, you think that things change. Indeed, by I take you to be committed 
to the truth of the claim that ‘certain times or events are absolutely present, 
and there is continual change in respect of which ones they are’. So be it. But 
that is not to say that time passes; for to say that time passes is to say that there 
is an entity, time, and that it performs an action: passing. And that is not 
something that any dynamic theorist (that I am aware of) has ever argued.  
Indeed, it seems probable that talk of time’s passing is a distraction. The 
claim that ‘time passes’ is a literary device. It is an instance of hypallage. 
Hypallage, sometimes known as a transferred epithet, is the transfer of an 
attribute away from its ‘proper’ subject, to an ‘improper’ subject. Examples 
include: ‘Jones made a careless mistake’, and, ‘Verity had a sleepless night. In 
the first case, it is not true that the mistake is careless: mistakes are not able 
to be careless. The ‘proper’ way to attribute carelessness is to say something 
of the form, ‘Jones was careless and made a mistake’. Likewise, in the second 
case: it is not the night that is sleepless. Rather, it is Verity who has not slept 
well during the night. 
Matters are similar in ‘the passage of time’. I take it that it is true to say 
that (typically—make what you will of Shoemaker (1969) cases) objects 
change or pass one another during a given period of time. Thus, a feather 
floating down a stream will pass the root of a tree that marks a point on the 
bank—similarly for other changes. Thus, whilst time does not pass, objects 
do and they pass by during periods of time. In that case, I take it that the proper 
subjects of the epithet are objects and that these may be said to pass one another. 
I thus find it unlikely that NAP* will be overturned for I think it unlikely that 
we will find reason to think that time passes at all. 
 
What, then, should we make of dynamic theories of time? In short, 
whatever we will. Let me repeat: as described, a dynamic theory of time 
commits to the truth of the claim that ‘certain times or events are absolutely 
  Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument  45 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 39, n. 4, pp. 35- 47, out.-dez. 2016. 
present, and there is continual change in respect of which ones they are’; that, 
and no more. But that is entirely consistent with the falsity of the claim that 
‘time passes’. Since no dynamic theorist then has a reason to think that there 
is a thing that is time that passes, so there will be no response to NAP*. And, 
if there is no response to NAP*, so we should conclude that time does not 
pass. Whether we wish adopt a dynamic theory of time at all, is another 
question altogether. 
 
 
5. A further worry 
 
Another worry that has been put to me on this score runs as follows. 
Here is an analogy to the argument presented. The conclusion of this 
analagous argument is that you are probably not as tall as yourself. 
Premise: in most usual cases, when a is said to be as tall as b, this is a 
contingent matter: in other circumstances a could have been shorter 
than b. Premise: in most usual cases, when a is said to be as tall as b, a 
and b are distinct objects. Inductive conclusion: therefore, it is probably 
not the case that you are as tall as yourself; if you were as tall as yourself, 
that would be a necessary rather than contingent fact, and if you were 
as tall as yourself this would be an example of the relation "as tall as" 
holding between an object and itself rather than between two distinct 
objects. 
Now, what all of this shows is just how absurd this kind of argument is. 
It’s clear from the analogue just given that this kind of argument can give us 
absolutely absurd conclusions. And we should not want to endorse 
conclusions of this absurd form. Thus, if this kind of argument leads us into 
absurd conclusions, then we should reject this kind of argument. 
However, as with the complaint given in section 4, I don’t see that this 
line of response is pressing. Let us grant, simply for the sake of the argument, 
that the allegedly analogous argument really is analogous (about which I’m a 
little doubtful). Let us also allow that it generates the absurd conclusion. My 
interlocutor claims that the conclusion of the argument is absurd. I agree. But 
I take that to be good grounds to outweigh the conclusion. (I think that there 
are probably also better arguments in the vicinity for outweighing the absurd 
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conclusion; a quick look around my office confirms to me that everything 
within it is as tall as itself.) I don’t imagine anyone disagreeing. It’s pretty 
obvious that there are objects that are as tall as themselves. Thus, I think that 
the allegedly analogous argument with an absurd conclusion has an absurd 
conclusion and that we can use this very fact to reject the conclusion.  
Is this any threat to the argument that I’ve presented? Presumably, there 
is a threat iff it is obvious that time passes. It was, after all, the obviousness 
of there being objects that are as tall as one another that allowed us to reject 
the absurd conclusion. 
So, is it obvious that ‘time passes’? Not, I think, unless there is a thing, 
time, that passes. If there is no thing, time, that passes, then it is obvious that 
time does not pass. And, given the remarks concerning hypallage and the 
commitments of dynamic theories of time, discussed at the end of section 4, 
I think it unlikely that the dynamic theorist will commit themselves to the 
claim that there is a thing, time, that passes.  
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